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Abstract 
 One way to promote equality is to encourage people to generate counter-stereotypic role-
models. In two experiments, we demonstrate that such interventions have much broader benefits 
than previously thought – reducing a reliance on heuristic thinking and decreasing tendencies to 
dehumanize outgroups. In Experiment 1, participants who thought about a gender counter-
stereotype (e.g., a female mechanic) demonstrated a generalized decrease in dehumanization 
towards a range of unrelated target groups (including asylum seekers and the homeless). In 
Experiment 2 we replicated these findings using alternative targets and measures of 
dehumanization. Furthermore, we found the effect was mediated by a reduced reliance on heuristic 
thinking. The findings suggest educational initiatives that aim to challenge social stereotypes may 
not only have societal benefits (generalized tolerance), but also tangible benefits for individuals 
(enhanced cognitive flexibility).  
 
(Word count: 129) 
Keywords: counter-stereotypes, prejudice, categorization, dehumanization, heuristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Some Extended Psychological Benefits of Challenging Social Stereotypes:  
Decreased Dehumanization and a Reduced Reliance on Heuristic Thinking  
 Stereotyping is one of the most persistent and pervasive problems of modern society (Eagly 
& Mladinic, 1989; Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005). Correspondingly, social psychological 
interventions have been developed to help challenge stereotyping in education and in industry 
(Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Kawakami, Dovidio, & Van Kamp, 2005). A particularly effective 
intervention involves encouraging individuals to generate counter-stereotypic role-models (Beaman, 
Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004; Tidball, Smith, 
Tidball, & Wolf-Wendel, 1999). In this research we investigated the extended benefits of 
interventions that employ counter-stereotypes. We argue that the value and effectiveness of these 
interventions might be much more expansive than previously thought. In particular, we test the idea 
that thinking about counter-stereotypes may have benefits that extend beyond the goal of promoting 
greater equality, to fostering enhanced cognitive flexibility and generalized tolerance towards a 
range of groups. In what follows, we first review the literature on counter-stereotypes, then go on to 
present our theoretical model of how exposure to counter-stereotypes may affect a particularly 
pernicious form of prejudice: the dehumanization of outgroups.  
Counter-Stereotypes Reduce Stereotyping 
Interventions that ask individuals to imagine a counter-stereotypic target (i.e., stereotypes of 
groups that do not typicality ‘go together’ such as a Gay Soldier or a Female Mechanic) have been 
found to reduce the negative impact of stereotypes in impression formation (Hastie, Schroeder, & 
Weber, 1990; Hutter & Crisp, 2005; 2006; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). This happens because 
counter-stereotypes prompt a shift from a heuristic, categorical mode of impression formation, to a 
more generative, individuated mode of impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; see also 
Brewer, 1988). As such, after being encouraged to think about a target along new, stereotypically 
incongruous dimensions of categorization the conflicting information must be conceptually 
integrated, inconsistencies resolved, and a revised impression formed. For instance, Hutter and 
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Crisp (2005) demonstrated that after thinking about gender counter-stereotypes (e.g., a “Female 
mechanic” or “Male nurse”), participants generated fewer constituent and more emergent (novel) 
attributes to describe the target. Hutter and Crisp argued that there are two distinct elements of 
inconsistency resolution in multiple category contexts: generative thought (reconstructing the target 
with individualized emergent attributes) and constituent disinheritance. Constituent disinheritance 
is the inhibition of stereotypic traits required to resolve the categorical inconsistency. If the target 
does not fit either constituent stereotype, those stereotypes must be, at least to an extent, discarded. 
Consistent with the idea that perceiving such counter-stereotypic combinations draws on processes 
outlined in Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) impression formation continuum, Hutter, Crisp, 
Humphreys, Waters, and Moffitt (2009) showed that perceivers appear to use categories at early 
stages of impression formation, but when the stereotypes of category combinations conflict, they 
shift to a more generative thinking (demonstrated by an increased use of emergent attributes). In 
short, when perceiving counter-stereotypes, in order to resolve the inconsistency perceivers shift out 
of a default heuristic thinking to a more systematic, and analytic cognitive style. 
Generalized Benefits of Counter-stereotypic Thinking 
Drawing on the aforementioned findings, in their Categorization-Processing-Adaptation-
Generalization (CPAG) model Crisp and Turner (2011) argued that the process of inconsistency 
resolution outlined above entails two processes: the inhibition of existing stereotypes, and a creative 
reconstrual of the target at hand. These two processes are said to lessen reliance on memory 
structures such as stereotypes, and facilitate impressions based on individuating and emergent 
attributes (resulting in enhanced cognitive flexibility). Inhibiting heuristic thought implies a 
tendency to ignore immediately obvious or dominant solutions to problems, thus freeing up 
resources for generative thinking. Cognitive flexibility, broadly construed, includes actively 
choosing cognitive strategies that fit individuals’ goals at that time (Showers & Cantor, 1985), 
intelligently adapting to one's environment (Berg & Sternberg, 1985), and creative thinking - 
finding unusual yet relevant solutions (e.g., Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Recent work by 
 5 
Gocłowska, Crisp, and Labuschagne (2013) provided initial evidence that gender counter-
stereotypes can be particularly effective in instigating different facets of cognitive flexibility. They 
showed that being encouraged to think about a gender counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic target 
leads to the generation of a higher number of ideas, as well as more flexible and more original ideas 
on a divergent creativity task. In the present work, we test the impact of gender counter-stereotypes 
on cognitive flexibility in terms of avoiding heuristic thought and in turn engaging in systematic 
processing. Crucially, Crisp and Turner’s (2011) CPAG model proposed that processing 
characteristics, once initiated by new and unexpected information, can become chronically or 
temporarily accessible in the form of a cognitive style or mindset. If this is the case, this means that 
counter-stereotypic interventions may have much broader impact than previously thought, such that 
this temporary cognitive shift of thinking which is less reliant on stored (stereotypic) knowledge 
may improve judgments towards a range of other groups who may typically be unfairly stereotyped.  
Mindsets are content-free processing orientations that are often linked to goals (Armor & 
Taylor, 2003; Gagne & Lydon, 2001; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), thus impact judgments 
independently of the context in which they were elicited. Very few studies have investigated the 
impact mindsets can have on group-based impressions, and they have been explored in very 
different contexts to the one we are testing, focusing on different cognitive mechanisms. For 
instance, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, 
and Dweck (2011) aimed to change people’s beliefs about outgroup malleability by inducing 
different ways of thinking. Across four experiments, Halperin and colleagues showed that inducing 
individuals with beliefs about the malleable versus fixed nature of groups encouraged more positive 
attitudes towards the outgroup, which then led to greater willingness to compromise for peace. That 
the intervention did not mention specific adversary groups during the induction stage, speaks to the 
viability of developing interventions that tackle people’s core cognition (i.e., the mindset they adopt 
when thinking about outgroups) rather than the content of their specific prejudices. Similarly, the 
recent work of Tadmor, Chao, Hong, and Polzer (2013) shows the reversed relationship between 
 6 
cognitive capacity and group-based impressions. These authors demonstrated for the first time that 
racial essentialism, which is strongly related to stereotyping, can hamper creativity and this 
relationship is explained by closed-mindedness. The fact that racial essentialism appears to exert its 
negative effects on creativity attests that it is the style of information processing rather than the 
content of one’s thinking that affects subsequent unrelated cognitive and social processes (Leung & 
Chiu, 2010; Tadmor et al., 2013; Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009). More recently, Vasiljevic and 
Crisp (2013) showed that when participants were put in a counter-stereotypic mindset by generating 
five counter-stereotypic category combinations, they subsequently exhibited lowered prejudice and 
increased generalized tolerance and egalitarianism towards multiple stigmatized outgroups (elderly, 
disabled, asylum seekers, HIV patients, and gay men). Interestingly, this intervention also enhanced 
generalized trust towards a multitude of outgroups in a context of historic violent intergroup conflict 
on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. In this intervention, participants were free to generate 
their own category combinations and these combinations varied widely between participants. 
Examples of category combinations generated by people carrying out the counter-stereotypicality 
task included: overweight - model, rich - student, female - firefighter, male - midwife, female - 
mechanic, black - president, blind – painter, and so on. Conversely, people carrying out the 
stereotypicality task generated combinations including: skinny - model, poor - student, male - 
firefighter, female - midwife, male - mechanic, white - president, sighted - painter, and many others. 
The fact that the novel intervention did not include a specific outgroup target may explain why it 
had more success than previous interventions at promoting generalized tolerance. The counter-
stereotypic category combinations generated differed widely between participants, and more 
importantly these combinations differed from the multiple target outgroups that were used as a 
measure of generalized prejudice reduction. 
Based on the above, our contention is that forming an impression of a target with counter-
stereotypic information may not only have an impact on the target at hand, but can stimulate a non-
heuristic, systematic processing style which, in turn, may impact subsequent judgements on 
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unrelated objects of cognition (see Crisp & Turner, 2011). In particular, in the light of research 
showing the relevance of gender categorization in social perception (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & 
Glass, 1992), we propose that thinking about a gender counter-stereotype may shift individuals out 
of heuristic modes of thinking, and in turn, remove the categorization prerequisite for intergroup 
bias. Because we propose a shift in mindset, the implication is that challenging gender stereotypes 
may promote lesser intergroup bias in general (i.e., towards a range of different groups). To provide 
the strongest possible test of this hypothesis, we sought to include measures of the most heinous and 
persistent forms of intergroup bias, dehumanization.  
Dehumanization  
In recent years, an increasing corpus of studies has shown the relevance and persistence of 
dehumanization, the tendency to consider others as less human than ourselves (Haslam, 2006). 
People, for instance, attribute human characteristics (e.g., curiosity, selfishness) to greater extent to 
themselves and their ingroup rather than to members of outgroups. Perceiving particular groups or 
individuals as subhuman can form the basis for justifying social and moral exclusion (Opotow, 
1990). Numerous scholars have connected dehumanization of victims to mass atrocities, such as 
genocide and ethnic cleansing (Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). Thus, 
the denial of others’ humanness can serve to justify the most atrocious forms of aggression and 
discrimination towards them (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; 
Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008).  
For the purposes of our paper we examine two theoretical strands of the dehumanization 
literature, namely theorizing on infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens et al., 2001), and 
theorizing on the distinction between animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). 
Leyens and colleagues were the first to relate dehumanization to ingroup bias, by showing that 
people attribute more secondary or uniquely human emotions to their ingroup than they do to 
relevant outgroups. Recently, Haslam (2006) extended these findings and distinguished between 
animalistic dehumanization—the denial of uniquely human traits (i.e., civility, refinement) —from 
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mechanistic dehumanization, which implies the denial of human nature traits (i.e., interpersonal 
warmth, openness).  Even though dehumanization constitutes arguably one of the most fundamental 
sources of intergroup bias, to date, very little is known of the socio-cognitive processes that can 
inhibit this phenomenon. An exception is the work by Costello and Hodson (2010) showing that 
heightened beliefs in animal–human similarity (by activating the super-ordinate common group of 
animals) can enhance the attribution of human traits to immigrants. Moreover, positive contact with 
outgroup members has been shown to reduce dehumanization (Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007; 
Tam et al., 2007), and leads to reduced anxiety and higher empathy, which are proximal predictors 
of outgroup humanization (Capozza, Trifiletti, Vezzali, & Favara, 2013). Albarello and Rubini 
(2012) have also recently demonstrated that dehumanization towards Black people can be reduced 
by reminding participants of their human identity and the cross-cutting multiple categories that they 
share with their targets of prejudice. In short, this research suggests that a pre-requisite for 
dehumanization is the categorization in to ‘us’ and ‘them’. As such, promoting such a mindset in 
which people no longer rely on heuristics (i.e., categorization) should correspondingly remove the 
cognitive pre-requisite for dehumanization. 
The Present Research 
 In this research we focused on gender counter-stereotypes as a way of challenging social 
stereotypes. This is because past research has shown gender is a categorization that is almost 
universally applied in impression formation (Stangor, et al., 1992). On the basis of predictions 
derived from Crisp and Turner’s (2011)  CPAG model and the research reviewed above we 
hypothesize that 1) Counter-stereotypic thinking will promote generalized tolerance manifested as a 
reduced tendency to dehumanize a range of outgroups unrelated to gender (generalized 
humanization hypothesis); 2) Counter-stereotypic thinking will promote a reduced reliance on 
heuristic thinking (heuristic thinking hypothesis); 3) Reduced heuristic thinking triggered by 
counter-stereotypes will mediate generalized humanization (mediational hypothesis).  
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To test these hypotheses we conducted a pilot study and two experiments. In all studies we 
used a counter-stereotypicality task that has been widely used in past literature (Hutter & Crisp, 
2005, 2006; Kunda et al., 1990). Specifically, we asked participants to consider a gender counter-
stereotypic combination (female mechanic; compared to controls) and list all words that come to 
mind in a limited amount of time. In the pilot study we established the efficacy of this manipulation 
for the purposes of the current investigation. In Experiment 1 we tested the generalized 
humanization hypothesis. In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 with 
an alternative measure of dehumanization as well as to test the heuristic thinking and mediation 
hypotheses.  
Pilot Study 
 A great deal of previous research has shown that stereotypic thinking is the default mode of 
social perception (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994; 
Hastie et al., 1990; Kunda et al., 1990; Sherman & Frost, 2000). Nonetheless, in an initial Pilot 
Study we sought to confirm this for the current project and materials. We hypothesized that 
participants asked to think of gender counter-stereotypic targets (female mechanic, male midwife) 
will find these targets more surprising, less familiar, and will individuate them more when opposed 
to participants asked to think of stereotypic combinations (female midwife, male mechanic), and 
also compared to participants who were asked to think of basic gender categories (female, male). 
Furthermore, in line with previous literature showing that stereotypic thinking is the default mode 
of thinking, we hypothesised that there will be no significant difference in surprise, familiarity and 
individuation between those participants who thought of stereotypic combinations and those who 
thought of basic gender categories. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Ninety-one students (57 females and 34 males, Mage = 21.70, SD = 3.41) were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions, whereby they were asked to think about and write down up to a 
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maximum of 20 characteristics: either on a gender counter-stereotypic target (female mechanic, or 
male midwife); a gender stereotypic target (male mechanic, or female midwife); or baseline gender 
targets alone (female, or male).  
Procedure and Materials 
 After the manipulation, we asked participants to self-report how surprising and familiar they 
found the categories that they were asked to think of. Answers were recorded on Likert-type scales 
anchored from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). These particular items were chosen in line with 
previous studies that have utilised similar scales to measure the surprise and familiarity associated 
with different social category conjunctions that were presented to participants (Kunda et al., 1990). 
Drawing from Hutter and colleagues’ (2013) study we measured participants’ individuation of the 
targets they were presented with. Participants were asked to indicate “how much do you view the 
target described above as …” (1 = individual, 7 = group member) [R]; “to what extent do you think 
of the target described above as unique individual” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); “to what extent 
does the type of person qualify as a typical group member” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) [R]; 
“how similar are individual members of the above group to other members of the same group?” (1 = 
not at all similar, 7 = very similar) [R]. Items denoted with R were reversed-scored, such that 
higher scores represent higher individuation. An index of target individuation was created 
(Cronbach’s α = .82). 
Results and Discussion 
We conducted a sequence of 3 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic vs. 
baseline) x 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 2 (participants gender: male vs. female) between 
subjects ANOVAs on surprise, familiarity and target individuation. As expected, counter-
stereotypic combinations were perceived as more surprising (M = 5.97; SD = 1.06), when compared 
to stereotypic combinations (M = 2.07; SD = 0.78, p < .001), and when compared to baseline (M = 
2.06; SD = 0.89, p < .001); F(2, 91) = 165.81, p < .001, η2 = .801. There was no significant 
difference between stereotypic and baseline conditions, p = .865. No other effect was significant 
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(target gender: F(1, 91) = 4.42, p = .05, η2 = .053; and participants’ gender: F(1, 91) = 0.00, p = 
.987, η2 = .000). Furthermore, counter-stereotypic combinations (M = 3.30; SD = 1.34) were 
perceived as less familiar than stereotypic combinations (M = 5.94; SD = 0.64, p < .001), and 
baseline (M = 5.88; SD = 0.74, p < .001); F(2, 91) = 71.90, p < .001, η
2
 = .646. There was no 
significant difference between stereotypic and baseline conditions, p = .973. No other effect was 
significant (target gender: F(1, 91) = 1.85, p = .176, η2 = .023; and participants’ gender: F(1, 91) = 
0.50, p = .486, η2 = .006). 
In terms of individuation, counter-stereotypic combinations (M = 4.78; SD = 0.98) led to 
increased target individuation when compared to stereotypic combinations (M = 2.94; SD = 0.52, p 
< .001), and when compared to baseline (M = 3.31; SD = 0.87, p < .001); F(2, 91) = 34.61, p < .001, 
η2 = .464.  There was no significant difference between stereotypic combinations and baseline 
conditions, p = .112. No other effect was significant (target gender: F(1, 91) = 0.14, p = .701; and 
participants’ gender: F(1, 91) = 0.03, p = .851). 
These results coupled with prior literature on stereotyping confirm that stereotypic 
combinations can be successfully used as a proxy for the baseline default thinking mode. Since we 
aimed to give participants tasks of equivalent load in Experiment 1 and 2 we decided to ask 
participants to think of stereotypic combinations as our control condition.  
Experiment 1 
  Experiment 1 tested the generalized humanization hypothesis on attitudes toward 
stigmatized minority groups. Participants provided judgments on four outgroup targets: asylum 
seekers, physically disabled people, elderly, and homeless people. The outgroups were chosen to be 
stigmatized on one or both dimensions as defined by the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Fiske and colleagues demonstrated that groups are evaluated along two 
primary characteristics: warmth and competence. For instance, physically disabled, elderly and 
learning disabled people are usually perceived as warm but incompetent. The homeless and asylum 
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seekers are perceived as neither warm nor competent, thereby eliciting disgust and avoidance 
(Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2001). 
Furthermore, according to Haslam (2006) targets such as physically disabled and people with 
schizophrenia are essentialized groups, in the sense that the denial of their human essence is 
attributed to inborn aspects instead of socially shaped, as it is the case for asylum seekers and the 
homeless. We therefore chose a selection of outgroups all of whom past research has shown to be 
viewed negatively on one or both of these dimensions, and who have a tendency to be 
dehumanized. 
 If gender counter-stereotypes trigger a cognitive style characterized by a lesser reliance on 
heuristic thinking, then this should be reflected in evaluations of diverse groups unrelated to gender 
(because existing stereotypes of those groups should no longer influence attitudes towards them). In 
particular, drawing from Haslam (2006) we asked participants to attribute human traits to outgroup 
members. A large amount of recent research has shown the persistence and pervasiveness of the 
tendency to deny outgroup members human characteristics; that is, dehumanization. We tested 
whether being compelled to think about gender counter-stereotypic targets leads to increased 
generalized “humanization” of multiple outgroups through the attribution of human traits.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
Eighty students (46 females and 34 males, Mage = 19.6, SD = 2.42) were randomly assigned 
to a counter-stereotypic or stereotypic condition.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were asked to think about either a counter-stereotypic category combination 
(female mechanic, or male midwife), or a stereotypic category combination (male mechanic, or 
female midwife), then they were given two minutes to generate as many adjectives as possible of the 
presented combination (Hutter & Crisp, 2005) before receiving the dependent measures. 
Dependent variables 
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Human trait attributions. According to Haslam (2006) we can differentiate two senses of 
humanness which are both essential to describe human beings. Human uniqueness (HU) 
characteristics define the boundary that separates human beings from animals, involving refinement, 
civility, morality, and higher cognition. Human nature (HN) characteristics distinguish humans from 
inanimate things, concerning emotional responsiveness, cognitive openness, agency, and 
individuality. The extent to which these uniquely human and human nature traits are denied to 
outgroup members constitutes a measure of the broader concept of dehumanization (see also Leyens 
et al., 2000; 2001).  
Participants were asked to define whether an average member of four minority social groups 
(asylum seekers, physically disabled people, elderly, and homeless people) possessed a series of 
characteristics compared to the average population on a 7-point scale (1= much less than average 
population to 7 = much more than average population). Specifically, participants rated the extent to 
which each social group possesses a series of twenty human traits compared to the average 
population. Ten traits referred to human uniqueness (e.g., idealism, carefulness) and ten referred to 
human nature (e.g., curiosity, selfishness).  
Perceived counter-stereotypicality. Participants were also required to indicate to what 
extent they perceived the target as surprising, familiar (R), easy to process (R) on a scale from 1 
(Not at all) to 5 (Very much) as manipulation check (Hutter & Crisp, 2005). We then created an 
index of perceived counter-stereotypicality (α = .77). 
Results and Discussion 
Perceived Counter-stereotypicality 
A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic) x 2 (target gender: male vs. 
female) between subjects ANOVA yielded a main effect of combination type. Counter-stereotypic 
category combinations were perceived as more counter-stereotypic (M = 3.17, SD = 0.76) than 
stereotypic combinations (M = 2.02, SD = 0.74), F(1, 80) = 45.25, p = .003, η
2
 = .369. As expected, 
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there was no significant effect of target gender, F(1, 80) = 0.45, p = .501, η2 = .000, nor a 
significant interaction, F(1, 80) = 0.83, p = .365, η2 = .011.  
Human Trait Attributions 
 Following established practice in the literature, we created two single indices of Human 
Nature and Human Uniqueness ascribed for each of the four different outgroups after reverse 
scoring the negatively worded items
1
 (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005). As shown in Table 1, 
human nature and human uniqueness trait attributions to each outgroup were positively correlated. 
 Human nature. A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic) x 2 (target 
gender: male vs. female) MANOVA was computed on the ratings of human nature for the four 
outgroups. The analysis revealed that participants in counter-stereotypic category combinations 
(irrespective of the gender composition of that combination) assigned greater human nature to the 
four outgroups (M = 4.30; SD = 0.71), when compared to the participants in stereotypic 
combinations (M = 3.68; SD = 0.74), F(1, 76) = 8.90, p = .004, η
2
 = .105. No other effects were 
significant, Fs <1.75. Confirming that the impact of the counter-stereotyping task affected all 
targets equally, further analysis revealed that the effects of combination type did not differ between 
the four outgroups, F(2.64, 200) = 0.62, p = .583, η2 = .008 (after correcting for violations of 
sphericity).  
 Human uniqueness. A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic) x 2 (target 
gender: male vs. female) MANOVA on the ratings of human uniqueness revealed that participants 
who made an impression of a counter-stereotypic target (irrespective of the gender composition of 
that combination) assigned more human uniqueness to all four different outgroups (M = 4.32; SD = 
0.82), when compared to participants who made an impression of a stereotypic target (M = 3.47; SD 
= 0.82), F(1, 76) = 29.23, p < .001, η2 = .278. No other effects were significant, Fs <1.23. As above, 
further analysis that tests for differences in dehumanization reduction between all outgroups, 
revealed that the interaction between combination type and outgroups was not significant, F(2.83, 
215) = 0.32, p = .796, η2 = .004 (after correcting for violations of sphericity), thus confirming our 
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generalized humanization hypothesis. Table 2 shows individual means and standard deviations of 
the human nature and human uniqueness traits attribution to each of the four outgroups. 
 In sum Experiment 1 confirmed the humanizing effects of perceiving gender counter-
stereotypic category combinations. Even though participants formed an impression of a person 
(female midwife/mechanic) entirely unrelated to the target outgroups (asylum seekers, physically 
disabled people, elderly, and homeless people), the counter-stereotypic combination led to lower 
bias against all of these target groups. This is consistent with our heuristic-switching hypothesis: 
Forming an impression of a counter-stereotypic target led to lesser reliance on stereotypic thinking, 
evident in higher ascription of human nature and human uniqueness, meaning inclusion in the 
human group. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to collect converging evidence of the generalized 
humanization effects revealed by Experiment 1 with a complementary measure and to ascertain 
direct evidence of the role of systematic processing as the underlying mechanism mediating the 
generalization of humanness to a range of outgroups. More specifically, we tested whether gender 
counter-stereotypic targets promote a reduced reliance on heuristics. In other words, if thinking 
about gender counter-stereotypes stimulates finer-grained judgments based on non-heuristic 
thinking (Hutter & Crisp, 2005), this would explain decreased dehumanization observed across 
multiple stigmatized outgroups (asylum seekers, homeless people, learning disabled people and 
people with schizophrenia). To further extend the findings of our first experiment, we employed a 
complementary measure of humanization based on a specific form of dehumanization, 
infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000; 2001). According to Leyens and colleagues primary 
emotions (e.g., anger, excitement) are shared between humans and animals, whilst secondary 
emotions (e.g., admiration, regret) are only uniquely human states. Hence, infrahumanization refers 
to the belief that outgroup members are able to express primary but not secondary emotions to the 
same extent as ingroup members, which is reflective of the belief that they are less human than the 
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ingroup (cf., Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001). Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, and 
Paladino (2007) argue that infrahumanization differs from dehumanization, since infrahumanization 
derives from an ingroup-outgroup comparison where the outgroup is simply regarded as less 
human, or more animal-like, than the ingroup. In contrast, dehumanization indicates an absolute 
judgment according to which outgroup members are not considered as humans. As such, for an 
inclusive test of the generalized impact of counter-stereotypes on dehumanizing forms of prejudice, 
we here employed a measure of infrahumanization. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of eighty students (62 females and 18 males; Mage = 19.4, SD = 2.28) were randomly 
assigned to a counter-stereotypic or stereotypic condition.  
Procedure and Materials  
 The experimental manipulation was similar to the one used in the first experiment. Since the 
previous experiment showed no difference as a function of the gender of the counter-stereotypic 
(stereotypic) category combinations, in Experiment 2 we considered only female category 
combinations whose stereotypes are perceived as more wide-spread, and resistant across time and 
cultures (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Participants were asked to form an 
impression of either a counter-stereotypic category combination (female mechanic) or a stereotypic 
category combination (male mechanic). In line with previous research on impression formation 
participants were given two minutes to generate as many adjectives as possible of the presented 
combination (Hutter & Crisp, 2005) before receiving the dependent measures.  
Dependent variables 
 Heuristic thinking. Drawing upon measures used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
participants were then given ten reasoning problems. They were instructed to solve as many of the 
problems as they could within a timeframe of ten minutes. An example of the reasoning problems 
follows:  “A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much does 
 17 
the ball cost?” The correct answer is 5 cents, but usually people tend to say 10 cents. Answers on 
the reasoning problems were coded dichotomously with 1 denoting a correct answer and 0 a wrong 
answer. Ratings on the ten reasoning problems had good internal reliability with a Cronbach’s α of 
.73, thus were collapsed in a single index. 
Primary and secondary emotions. Participants were then asked to define how much they 
think the average member of four stigmatized social groups (asylum seekers, learning disabled 
people, people with schizophrenia, and homeless people) experiences twelve emotions compared to 
the average population on a 7-point scale (1= infrequently experiences to 7 = frequently 
experiences). Emotional terms were chosen from Paladino and Vaes’ (2000) pre-test conducted on 
the Italian translations of emotions. Primary emotions measured ascriptions of pleasure, happiness, 
desire, fear, pain, and rage. Secondary emotions measured ascriptions of embarrassment, remorse, 
melancholy, shame, compassion, and pride. Words denoting negative and positive emotions were 
equally balanced across the measures of primary and secondary emotions (Demoulin et al., 2004). 
The order of the emotions was randomized. 
Perceived counter-stereotypicality. As in Experiment 1, participants indicated to what 
extent they perceived the target as surprising, familiar (R), easy to process (R) on a scale from 1 
(Not at all) to 5 (Very much). We then created an index of perceived counter-stereotypicality (α = 
.69). 
Results and Discussion 
Perceived Counter-stereotypicality 
 A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic) between subjects ANOVA 
yielded a main effect of combination type. Counter-stereotypic category combinations were 
perceived as more counter-stereotypic (M = 3.59, SD = 0.65) than stereotypic categorizations (M = 
2.07, SD = 0.88), F(1, 76) = 75.46, p = .002, η2 = .492. 
Heuristic Thinking  
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An independent samples t-test showed that participants who formed an impression of a 
counter-stereotypic target relied less on heuristic thinking and got a higher number of correct 
answers when solving Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) conundrums (M = 5.13, SD = 1.98), 
compared to participants who formed an impression of a stereotypic target (M = 3.5, SD = 1.85), 
t(78)= -3.79, p < .001, r = .39. This indicated participants had switched out of a heuristic way of 
thinking, and utilised a more systematic approach to problem solving, supporting the heuristic 
thinking hypothesis. 
Primary and Secondary Emotions 
 Single indices of primary and secondary emotions for each of the four different outgroups 
were created
2
. A MANOVA was computed on the ratings of primary emotions for the four 
outgroups, revealing as expected that there was no significant difference in the ratings of primary 
emotions assigned to the four outgroups as a function of the counter-stereotypicality of the 
impression formation target, F(4, 75) = 1.81, p = .135, η2 = .088 (Mcounter-stereotypic = 4.24, SD = 0.42 
vs. Mstereotypic = 4.39, SD = 0.43).  
 In contrast, the MANOVA on the ratings of secondary emotions revealed that participants 
who formed an impression of a counter-stereotypic target attributed more secondary emotions to all 
four different outgroups (M = 4.85, SD = 0.71), when compared to participants who made an 
impression of a stereotypic target (M = 3.89, SD = 0.53), F(4, 75) = 3.65, p = .01, η
2
 = .161. For 
individual means and standard deviations of the primary and secondary emotions attributed to each 
of the four outgroups see Table 3.  Further analysis with combination type as a between-subjects 
factor showed that the effect of combination type did not differ between the four outgroups, F(3, 
234) = 2.58, p = .066, η2 = .031 supporting the generalized humanization hypothesis.  
Mediational Analysis 
 We computed a mediational analysis to test reduced reliance on heuristic thinking as a 
mediator in the relationship between combination type and generalized attribution of secondary 
emotions towards the four outgroups ( = .67), using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping 
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procedure. As expected, we found a significant path between combination type and aggregated 
secondary emotions (β = .34, p < .005). Combination type also predicted the mediator, reduced 
heuristic thinking or systematic processing (β = .39, p < .005). The path between systematic 
processing and secondary emotions was also significant (β =.40, p < .005). However, when the 
mediator was controlled (β = .32, p < .05) the relationship between combination type and secondary 
emotions became non-significant (β = .22, p = .555). The lack of the presence of a zero within the 
95% confidence intervals (LLCI = .0359, ULCI = .3550) demonstrated that reduced general 
tendency to engage in heuristic thinking elicited by counter-stereotypic combinations mediated the 
effect on attribution of secondary emotions to outgroups.  
 Experiment 2 supported the hypothesis that perceiving counter-stereotypic category 
combinations reduces reliance on heuristics, which, in turn, helps explain tendencies towards 
generalized humanization. Participants who thought of a counter-stereotypic category combination 
relied less on heuristics in problem solving than people who thought of a stereotypic category 
combination. Previous research has shown that the perception of others along multiple counter-
stereotypic categories decreases intergroup prejudice towards the target considered (Crisp, 
Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001), as well as increasing generalized tolerance (Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
This experiment demonstrates that the effects of thinking about a counter-stereotypic combination 
can also reduce dehumanizing prejudice towards multiple outgroups via reductions in heuristic 
thinking. After thinking about a counter-stereotypic category combination, participants were more 
likely to attribute secondary and not primary emotions towards different stigmatized outgroups.  
General Discussion 
 Our research tested the viability of counter-stereotypic thinking as a means of reducing 
generalized tendencies to dehumanize outgroups, via a reduced reliance on heuristic thinking. In 
Experiment 1 we employed Haslam’s (2006) concepts of human nature and human uniqueness and 
demonstrated that forming an impression of gender counter-stereotypic category combination led to 
an enhanced attribution of human traits to four different outgroups, Experiment 2 confirmed these 
 20 
findings on measures of infrahumanization. Specifically, our results showed that thinking of female 
counter-stereotypes increased the attribution of secondary emotions toward multiple stigmatized 
outgroups. Importantly, we also found support for the hypothesized mediating role of reduced 
heuristic processing arising from counter-stereotypic thinking. 
These findings go beyond previous evidence supporting the assumption that not just 
increasing the number of categorical dimensions (Albarello & Rubini, 2012), but increasing the 
complexity of their interrelations, can lead to reductions in dehumanization. Even more 
interestingly, this effect was extended to multiple unrelated and stigmatized outgroups. We were 
able to show that generating counter-stereotypes led to a generalized humanization process towards 
a variety of outgroups usually targeted via diverse forms of discrimination. The range of outgroups 
included stereotypically distinct targets (see Fiske et al., 2002). In this vein, exposing people to 
counter-stereotypic information can be conceived as a promising intervention to counteract 
prejudice against deeply stigmatized social groups. This compelling result also extends the role of 
gender counter-stereotypes in promoting cognitive flexibility. Another novel aspect of these 
findings concerns the evidence that cognitive flexibility not only improves judgment accuracy, but 
also promotes an enlargement of human group boundaries. In other words, we showed that gender 
counter-stereotypes have an important role to play in improving intergroup relations.  
 The relevance of these findings lies in the pervasiveness of dehumanizing prejudice 
(Haslam, 2006), as well as in the potential implications of increasing perceptions of stigmatized 
groups as fully human. Indeed they emphasize outgroup members’ belonging to the moral human 
community, and this as literature shows (Opotow, 1990), prevents them from being subjected to the 
most extreme forms of discrimination, assuring common rights and reciprocal respect.  
Limitations and future directions 
First, the use of a specific gender-occupation counter-stereotype did not allow generalization 
of the intervention’s validity to other types of category conjunction. Future research should address 
this limitation by considering alternative (or additional) counter-stereotypic exemplars. In this 
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regard, it is possible that counter-stereotypic thinking can benefit from only chronically accessible 
categories like gender, such as race, age, and physical appearance (cf. Bargh & Thein, 1985; 
Higgins & King, 1981). However, prior research has also shown that, except for highly racially 
prejudiced perceivers, people make greater use of gender than race as a category because they find 
gender differences more informative than race differences (Stangor et al., 1992). This highlights the 
strength of surprising gender-based category combinations to reduce wider prejudice, suggesting 
that counter-stereotypes of other highly relevant groups may not produce the same strength of 
effect, or their efficiency may be limited on the basis of the importance attributed by perceivers to 
the categories considered.  
However, it is noteworthy that research by Vasiljevic and Crisp (2013), who asked 
participants to generate their own unique counter-stereotypic category combinations, demonstrated 
increases in generalized tolerance towards multiple outgroups. Indeed, in this spontaneous 
generation task it is likely that participants combined social categories that they perceived as most 
relevant and informative. Hence, if our manipulation was extended to test other counter-stereotypic 
conjunctions similar decreases in generalized dehumanization might be achieved only when 
perceivers regard the categories as relevant to the task at hand.  
Second, research on expectancy violation has shown several important short-term effects 
including enhanced attention and more elaborate processing (see Roese & Sherman, 2007). This 
would suggest the humanizing effects of counter-stereotypes may be short-lived. Future research 
should address this issue in more detail. However, we would argue that, as proposed by Crisp and 
Turner’s (2011) CPAG model, repeated exposure to counter-stereotypic diversity should lead to an 
adaptive tendency to think more flexibly, in general, and in a range of domains.  
Another important thing to note is that counter-stereotypic thinking can backfire. 
McKimmie, Master, Masser, Schuller, and Terry (2013) showed that the benefit of the more 
accurate impression formation elicited by counter-stereotypes comes at a cost. Specifically, they 
found that processing counter-stereotypes led to reduced attention for contextual features that 
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eventually altered decision making about a target involved in a criminal case investigation. Future 
empirical investigations should further examine any such paradoxical effects of counter-stereotypic 
thinking. 
Finally, counter-stereotypic exemplars are sometimes subtyped, which leaves the initial 
stereotype intact (Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping is particularly pronounced for extreme 
exemplars (Kunda & Oleson, 1997), raising doubts about the usefulness of counter-stereotypic 
thinking about extreme exemplars. However, research has also demonstrated that subtyping ensues 
in the presence of further, often neutral information (e.g., an introverted lawyer working in a small 
or big firm), but it tends not to occur when only category information is available (e.g., an 
introverted lawyer) [Kunda & Oleson, 1995]. We surmise that subtyping did not occur in our 
experiments because we did not provide participants with any additional information apart from the 
given category combination.  
Conclusions 
These findings suggest that efforts to promote social and cultural diversity – specifically 
those that focus on counter-stereotypes - may be of value not just because they reduce 
discrimination of the target at hand, but because they can foster a lesser reliance on heuristic 
thinking, and lead to greater humanization of a range of different stigmatized groups. In other 
words, counter-stereotypes can have generalized effects on the perception of groups, and 
importantly, they extend social inclusion of outgroup members to the overarching category of 
humankind.  
The mechanism underlying this effect – a switching from heuristic to systematic thinking - 
has potentially profound implications for attempts to foster diversity. It demonstrates that counter-
stereotypes may be of value not only because they can foster equality, but because they can improve 
individuals’ capacity for cognitive flexibility, helping them avoid the typical biases that hamper 
judgment and decision-making in everyday life. Importantly, this may provide the intrinsic 
motivation for engaging in social and cultural diversity programs that has been missing in the past. 
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Majority groups typically prefer assimilation-like strategies of social integration, likely because true 
equality means, for them, giving up resource. However, if it is substantiated that engaging in social 
diversity programs promotes individually enhanced cognitive capacity, this may provide a 
significant incentive to engage in such programs in the future.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Human nature traits attributed to each of the four outgroups (asylum seekers, elderly people, 
physically disabled people, homeless people) had a good internal reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha 
respectively of .66, .77, .73, .72 thus were collapsed in four single indices. Similarly, uniquely 
human traits for each of the four outgroups had a good internal reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha 
respectively of .75, .77, .78, .84 thus were collapsed in four single indices. 
2
 Primary emotions attributed to each of the four outgroups (asylum seekers, learning disabled 
people, people with schizophrenia, homeless people) had a slightly good internal reliability with a 
Cronbach’s alpha respectively of .56, .53, .63, .65 thus were collapsed in four single indices. 
Similarly, secondary emotions for each of the four outgroups had a good internal reliability with a 
Cronbach’s alpha respectively of .71, .78, .72, .72 thus were collapsed in four single indices. 
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Table 1: Attributions of Human Nature (HN) and Human Uniqueness (HU) as a function of 
combination type (Experiment 1).  
 
 Combination Type 
 Stereotypic Counter-Stereotypic 
Outgroups M SD M SD 
 Human Nature 
Asylum seekers 3.89 .73 4.27 .55 
Elderly 4.01 .80 4.39 .74 
Physically disabled 3.79 .70 4.32 .75 
Homeless 3.85 .76 4.22 .82 
 Human Uniqueness 
Asylum seekers 3.62 .57 4.37 .78 
Elderly 3.79 .70 4.33 .79 
Physically disabled 3.75 .65 4.20 .88 
Homeless 3.87 .91 4.36 .86 
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Table 2: Attributions of Primary and Secondary Emotions as a function of combination type 
(Experiment 2).  
 
 Combination Type 
 Stereotypic Counter-Stereotypic 
Outgroups M SD M SD 
 Primary Emotions 
Asylum seekers 4.41 .55 4.00 .67 
Learning disabled 4.40 .78 3.89 .62 
People with 
schizophrenia 
4.36 .71 4.27 .70 
Homeless 4.39 .67 4.39 .66 
 Secondary Emotions 
Asylum seekers 3.82 .98 4.44 .85 
Learning disabled 3.90 .91 4.35 .71 
People with 
schizophrenia 
3.87 1.06 4.58 .81 
Homeless 3.99 1.09 4.04 1.06 
 
 
 
 
 
